Sportsman

看了一集财经郎眼, 郎咸平谈到了迈克尔杰克逊的成功是因为触动各个时代人们的集体性人格 (羞涩与狂放，躁动与宁谧, 摆脱一切羁绊与束缚), 所以才跨越了比猫王, 披头士等其他巨星更长的年代.

我并不是一个MJ迷, 只是对Thriller, Beat It, Smooth Criminal, Heal the World等歌非常喜欢, 最近很喜欢学唱 (不过没那种爆发力和pitch), 因为非常酷 (节奏感和唱法). 但是看过This Is It以后, 我确实被震撼了, 被他对音乐的投入, 专注震撼了. 那种追求完美, 极致足以感染任何人.

These days with US President Barack Obama visiting China, a new catchphrase is created: Strategic Reassurance. What does U.S. want to reassure? While previous government’s “Responsible Stakeholder” (urging China to become) puts U.S. at a more dominant, commanding position, “Strategic Reassurance” lowers U.S. position (as Obama administration has always done since taking the office), as U.S. currently needs other countries’ help to pull through crisis.

China as a Responsible Stakeholder

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=998

Strategic Reassurance

Lurking under this discussion is the question of whether "strategic reassurance" dovetails with or challenges China's own policy priorities. The Obama administration urgently needs to clarify this. The Chinese have lately been calling on international partners and interlocutors to undertake relations based on respect for China's "core interests." Beijing identifies these as being, in order of priority: the stability and preservation of the current authoritarian regime; respect for the territorial integrity of China; and the preservation of a positive environment for China's continued economic and political rise.

If Washington's "strategic reassurance" means reassuring China that the U.S. will not challenge these priorities, it would mark a major change in U.S. policy, particularly with respect to Beijing's top priority of preserving the current regime. China scholar Aaron Friedberg has noted that political liberalization has long been an important underlying policy objective of U.S. dealings with China. This is as it should be, given that many of the fundamental tensions in the U.S.-China relationship arise from or are amplified by the differences in the two countries' domestic political systems. Abandonment of this policy objective would be a serious strategic error.

If "strategic reassurance" was developed primarily with China's third priority of a positive environment for its continued rise in mind it would still be a mistake. U.S. policy makers have frequently misidentified China's real priorities and, as a result, developed mismatched policy responses that failed to take full advantage of leverage that could be used to advance U.S. interests. The six-party talks on North Korea are a good example: The U.S. side has operated under a misguided belief that the Chinese cared more about helping achieve American goals than they do, and even worked to allay China's concerns about the North Korean regime's stability instead of using these to push China to act more forcefully.